Overview
Algorithmic systems have been used to inform consequential decisions for at least a century. Recidivism prediction dates back to the 1920s (Burgess 1928) , (Monachesi 1950) , (Trainor 2015) . Automated credit scoring dates began in the middle of the last century (McCorkell 2002) , (Trainor 2015) , (Lauer 2017) , but the last decade has witnessed an acceleration in the adoption of prediction algorithms.
They are deployed to screen job applicants (Cowgill 2018a) , (Cappelli, Tambe, and Yakubovich 2019) for the recommendation of products, people, and content, as well as in medicine (diagnostics and decision aids) (Ustun and Rudin 2017) , ("MDCalc -Medical Calculators, Equations, Scores, and Guidelines" n.d.), criminal justice (Cowgill 2018b) , (Megan Stevenson 2018) (setting bail and sentencing), facial recognition (Eubanks 2018) , (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018) , (Raji and Buolamwini 2019) , lending and insurance (Jeong 2019) , and the allocation of public services (Eubanks 2018) , (Abebe and Goldner 2018) .
The prominence of algorithmic methods has led to concerns regarding their systematic unfairness in their treatment of those whose behavior they are predicting. These concerns have found their way into the popular imagination through news accounts (Dastin 2018) and general interest books (O'Neill 2016) , (Broussard 2018) , (Noble 2018) . Even when these algorithms are deployed in domains subject to regulation, it appears that existing regulation is poorly equipped to deal with this issue (Sullivan and Schweikart 2019) .
The word 'fairness' in this context is a placeholder for three related equity concerns. First, such algorithms may systematically discriminate against individuals with a common ethnicity, religion, or gender, irrespective of whether the relevant group enjoys legal protections. The second is that these algorithms fail to treat people as individuals. Third, who gets to decide how algorithms are designed and deployed. These concerns are present when humans, unaided, make predictions.
So what is new here? Scale for one. These algorithms are being implemented precisely so as to scale up the number of instances a human decision maker can handle. Recruiters, for example, can process thousands of resumes in the blink of an eye.
As a consequence, errors that once might have been idiosyncratic become systematic. Ubiquity, is also novel -success in one context justifies usage in other domains. Credit scores, for example, are used in contexts well beyond what their inventors originally imagined. Thirdly, accountability must be considered. Who is responsible for an algorithm's predictions? How might one appeal against an algorithm? How does one ask an algorithm to consider additional information beyond what its designers already fixed upon?
The concern for fairness is often set up in competition with a concern for accuracy. The first is seen as difficult to measure and hard to pin down, not least because one is concerned with fairness along a variety of dimensions such as income, health, and access to opportunity. Measuring accuracy, on the other hand is seen as unambiguous and objective. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Decisions based on predictive models suffer from two kinds of errors that frequently move in opposite directions: false positives and false negatives. Further, the probability distribution over the two kinds of errors is not fixed but depends on the modeling choices of the designer. As a consequence, two different algorithms with identical false positive rates and false negative rates can make mistakes on very different sets of individuals with profound welfare consequences. Prediction also depends crucially on the availability of data and data can be compromised in many ways -unevenness of coverage, sample bias, and noise. Hence, there are no simple and portable takeaways.
Motivated by these considerations the CCC's Fairness and Accountability Task Force held a visioning workshop on May 22-23, 2019 , that brought together computer science researchers with backgrounds in algorithmic decision making, machine learning, and data science with policy makers, legal experts, economists, and business leaders. The workshop discussed methods to ensure economic fairness in a data-driven world. Participants were asked to identify and frame what they thought were the most pressing issues and to outline some concrete problems. This document is a synthesis of these comments.
We begin with four broad remarks that are helpful to frame one's thinking. First is an equity principle for evaluating outcomes (see Roemer and Trannoy (2016) The third relates to the burgeoning field of fair machine learning whose goal is to ensure that decisions guided by algorithms are equitable. Over the last several years, myriad formal definitions of fairness have been proposed and studied by the computer science community (Narayanan 2018) , (Hutchinson and Mitchell 2019) , (Mitchell et al. 2018 ). One idea calls for similar individuals to be treated similarly (Dwork et al. 2012) , and requires an appropriate measure of similarity. Another idea calls for group-based definitions, requiring, for example, that algorithms have approximately equal error rates across groups defined by protected attributes, like race and gender (Calders and Verwer 2010) , (Edwards and Storkey 2015) , (Hardt et al. 2016) , (Kamiran, Karim, and Zhang 2012) , (Pedreshi, Ruggieri, and Turini 2008) , (Zafar et al. 2015) , (Zemel et al. 2013 ). However, Chouldechova (2017) and Kleinberg et al. (2018) the classifier used for another group (Zafar et al. 2017 ), (Dwork et al. 2018) , (Ustun, Liu, and Parkes 2019) . Others advocate for adopting a welfare-economics viewpoint in interpreting appeals to fairness (Hu and Chen 2019) , (Mullainathan 2018) .
The fourth relates to data biases (Suresh and Guttag 2019) . All statistical algorithms rely on training data, which implicitly encode the choices of algorithm designers and other decision makers. For example, facial recognition algorithms have been found to perform worse on dark-skinned individuals, in part because of a dearth of representative training data across subgroups (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018) , (Raji and Buolamwini 2019) .
In other cases, the target of prediction (e.g., future arrest)
is a poor -and potentially biased -proxy of the underlying act (e.g., conducting a crime). Finally, when the training data are themselves the product of ongoing algorithmic decisions, one can create feedback loops that reinforce historical inequities (Kallus and Zhou 2018) , (Ensign et al. 2018) , (Lum and Isaac 2016) . Mitigating these biases in the data is arguably one of the most serious challenges facing the design of equitable algorithms.
Decision Making and Algorithms
At present, the technical literature focuses on 'fairness' at the algorithmic level. The algorithm's output, however, is but one among many inputs to a human decision maker.
Therefore, unless the decision maker strictly follows the recommendation of the algorithm, any fairness requirements satisfied by the algorithm's output need not be satisfied by the actual decisions. Green and Chen (2019) , for example, report on an mTurk study that shows participants were more likely to deviate upward from algorithmic risk assessments for black defendants. M. Stevenson and Doleac (2019) 
Assessing Outcomes
The outcome of an intervention can differ from its predicted Another challenge is that the environments in which algorithm-assisted decision making are deployed are always in flux. Consider hiring -today a firm may value individuals with analytical skills but tomorrow people skills may become the priority. Automated tools for hiring may also lead to defining a more and more narrow set of characteristics to allow it to consider a larger set of candidates. See, for example, the advice given to job seekers here: https://www.jobscan.co/blog/top-resumekeywords-boost-resume/.
Metrics to measure the extent of discrimination sometimes play an important role in regulatory guidelines but are challenging to develop and tend to be narrow in scope with effects that are hard to anticipate. A first example is the "four-fifths rule" of EEOC guidelines, which states that if the selection rate for a protected group is less than four-fifths of that for the group with the highest rate then this constitutes evidence of adverse impact. 9 A second example is the use of a single metric to measure the performance of a system. Such a metric can easily miss inequality that arises through complex effects (Crenshaw 1989) , (Grusky and Ku 2008) , (Grusky and Ku 2008) . The domains in which algorithms are deployed are highly complex and dynamic, and data can pick up intersectional and multi-dimensional sources of discrimination (Abebe,
Kleinberg, and Weinberg 2019).
Strategic considerations also play a role. For any proposed metric, one needs to identify the affected parties and their possible responses. 10 Therefore, policies cannot be judged ceteris paribus. Some existing research has shown that changing the incentive structure of those implementing or using algorithmic recommendations can in itself also be a tool for change (see Kannan et al. (2017) for example).
Theoretical research, particularly "impossibility theorems" (Chouldechova 2017) , (Kleinberg et al. 2018) , reveal that multiple attractive fairness properties are impossible to achieve simultaneously. Hence, it is inevitable that someone's notion of fairness will be violated and that tradeoffs need to be made about what to prioritize. These 6 The implicit suggestion of the work of Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) on biases in facial recognition technology (FRT) is that were there more programmers with dark skin this wouldn't have happened.
7 Some exceptions include work on discrimination and bias in the context of facial recognition technology (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018) , online ads (Sweeney 2013 ), word-embeddings (Bolukbasi et al. 2016) , search engines (Noble 2018 ) and health information (Abebe et al. 2019) . 8 In credit scoring, for example, Kilbertus et al. (2019) suggest approving everyone with a high enough score, and randomly approving applicants with an insufficient score. 9 This can be applied to any decisions related to employees -including hiring, promotion, and training.
10 For instance, there is a literature (Coate and Loury 1993) in economics on what role a community's belief that they will be treated fairly (such as in education or access or the job market) affects their incentives to invest in human capital.
results do not negate the need for improved algorithms.
On the contrary, they underscore the need for informed discussion about fairness criteria and algorithmic approaches that are tailored to a given domain. Also, we must recognize that these impossibility results are not about algorithms, per se. Rather, they describe a feature of any decision process, including one that is executed entirely by humans.
The discussion above suggests the following questions: c) Can we usefully model the feedback loop when designing metrics, and can we understand when a deployed system will still be able to be used for inference on cause and effect?
d) How can we design automated systems that will do appropriate exploration in order to provide robust performance in changing environments? e) Can we understand the common issues that prevent the adoption of algorithmic decision-making systems across domains and the common issues that produce harm across multiple domains?
Regulation and Monitoring
Prohibitions against discrimination in lending, housing, and hiring are codified in law but do not provide the precise way in which compliance will be monitored. Poorly designed regulations have costly consequences in terms of compliance costs for firms, as well as generate harm to individuals.
Some have argued for "output'' regulation. The "four-fifths rule", mentioned above, is an example. Others favor "input'' regulation because they are more easily monitored than outputs.
Another challenge is that the disruption of traditional organizational forms by platforms (e.g., taxis, hotels, headhunting firms) has dispersed decision making. Who is responsible for ensuring compliance on these platforms, and how can this be achieved? On the one hand, platforms may be immune to existing regulation. Ostensibly innocuous, such recommendation and rating systems can have huge impacts. One area of concern, for example, is whether these kinds of systems can lead to the consumption of less diverse content. Although the effect of recommender systems on diversity is debated (Nguyen et al. 2014) , (Fleder and Hosanagar 2009) , (Möller et al. 2018) , this would then mean algorithms having a role in creating filter bubbles, which have in turn been argued to exacerbate polarization. (2019) and Colson (2019) in regard to data science training.
Educational and Workforce Implications
Looking forward, it seems important to understand 
Broader Considerations
Some discussion amongst participants went to concerns about academic credit and how the status quo may guide away from applied work, noting also that the context of more applied work can be helpful in attracting more diverse students into computer science (Whittaker et al. 2018 14 A thread that ran through all the discussions at the meeting was a sense that the research community may 'narrow frame' the issues under consideration. This is the tendency to define the choices under review too narrowly.
For example, the problem of selecting from applicants those most qualified to perform a certain function is not the same as guaranteeing that the applicant pool includes those who might otherwise be too disadvantaged to compete.
The focus on prediction also leads to narrow framing. 12 There is also a role for organizations such as Black in AI in fostering the involvement of individuals from under-represented groups and advocating for taking a multi-disciplinary perspective in AI fairness.
